Mine Is Yours: Modes of Expense Sharing in Married and Cohabiting Households by Warner, Catharine Hobart
Abstract
Title of Thesis: MINE IS YOURS: MODES OF EXPENSE SHARING IN
MARRIED AND COHABITING HOUSEHOLDS
Catharine Hobart Warner, Master of Arts, 2007
Thesis Directed by: Professor John Iceland
Department of Sociology
Relatively little is known about differences in how married and cohabiting couples share
their economic resources. Using the 2001 panel of the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP), this study compares the extent of household expense sharing among
married and cohabiting couples focusing on gender specialization differences between
married and cohabiting couples. Current debates question the relative differences
between married and cohabiting relationships. Multinomial logistic analyses suggest that
relative resources indeed do much to explain who pays the majority of household
expenses, but also find support for differences across family structure. Married couples
are more likely than cohabiting couples to have a single male provider compared to other
sharing arrangements. Households with a child not biologically related to one partner are
more likely to have a female provider, while households with biological children are
more likely to have a male provider.
MINE IS YOURS:




Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in Sociology
2007
ADVISORY COMMITTEE:











Differences in Married and Cohabiting Relationships ………………………....5
The Presence of Children, Relationship Stability and Shared Expenses ………9
Relative Resources: Income and Employment ………………………………..12
Contributions to the Literature and Hypotheses ……………………………………...14












Married couples share economic resources through a variety of household
allocative systems, including joint accounts, pooled income or “common pots,” and
separate money management practices (Pahl 1983, 1990, 1994; Treas 1993). Until
recently, few studies have addressed the income allocation patterns of both married and
cohabiting couples in the United States (Heimdal & Houseknecht 2003; Kenney 2004,
2006). While women are entering the labor force at higher rates, and more women
remain in the labor force after having children (Casper & Bianchi 2002; Fullerton 1999),
relatively little is known about the ways in which couples share these increasingly joint
economic resources. In fact, the ways in which marital status, relationship stability, and
the presence of biological and non-biological children in the household may influence
income allocation patterns remain unclear.
Rising rates of cohabitation and the increasing number of children experiencing
cohabitation have brought greater focus on children’s well-being in cohabiting families
(e.g., Brown 2004; Bumpass & Lu 2000; Graeffe and Lichter 1999; Manning & Brown
2006; Manning, Smock, and Majumdar 2004; Raley, Frisco, and Wildsmith 2005; Smock
2000). U.S. government reports on poverty often feature the family as an economic unit,
thus omitting the possible income contributions of cohabiting adults. Including
cohabiting partners as income sources in official poverty measures could change
perceptions of the extent of child poverty in the United States (Bauman 1999; Iceland
2000, 2003; Kenney 2004; Manning & Brown 2006). Yet, it is not clear the extent to
which both partners do contribute to household expenses in cohabiting relationships.
Furthermore, household allocative systems are representative of the construction of
gendered responsibilities within the household (Vogler 2005; Vogler & Pahl 1994). The
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potential for income allocation to reflect gender normative beliefs suggests that
household expense sharing patterns are not only influenced by financial resources, but
also by family structure and relationship characteristics. In order to better understand
differences across marriage and cohabitation, it is useful to consider the division of
household expenses in married and cohabiting couples. This paper takes a closer look at
which partner pays for key household expenses among married and cohabiting,
heterosexual couples.
Though research on income allocation patterns in married couples addresses the
role of relative resources in influencing income sharing, but comparatively little is known
about whether social norms of expense sharing present in married-couple families occur
with the same frequency in cohabiting ones. I therefore examine the extent to which both
partners share expenses, both partners pay for expenses separately, the male partner pays
household expenses, or the female partner pays household expenses in these different
family arrangements. In this analysis, I take careful consideration of relative resources of
each partner across key characteristics, such as education, employment, and income, in
order to more accurately assess relationship differences between married and cohabiting
couples. Using cross-sectional data from the 2001 Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP), this study addresses two specific research questions: 1) To what
extent do patterns of expense sharing differ among married and cohabiting couple
families? 2) Do relationship characteristics and the presence of children play a different
role in the two arrangements?
This paper offers a unique contribution to our understanding of income pooling
among married and cohabiting couples. To date, no nationally representative study has
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explicitly compared whether the nature of these two relationships, controlling for relative
resources, shape patterns of expense sharing in similar ways for both types of couples. On
the one hand, cohabitation may be a path to marriage for many couples, and they would
therefore likely exhibit similar levels of trust and financial exchange as married partners.
On the other hand, financial, work, union, and fertility decisions may be quite different
across the two relationship types. Thus, the aim of this paper is to arrive at a better
understanding of differences in expense-sharing dynamics among married and unmarried
partners.
Background
Cohabitation has become increasingly common across all race, income, age, and
education groups (Casper & Bianchi 2002; Smock 2000). Unmarried women are
cohabiting at greater rates than in the past, and the frequency with which older age
cohorts cohabit is increasing as women move into older age groupings, though
cohabitation still appears most common among younger cohorts, age 25 to 39 (Bumpass
& Lu 2000). With the rise in the prevalence of cohabitation and declining rates of
marriage, the meaning of marriage and the nature of these two relationship types has
piqued the interest of sociologists (Brines & Joyner 1999; Cherlin 2000, 2004; Edin,
Kefalas, & Reed 2004; Manning & Brown 2006; Vogler 2005).
Demographic differences, on average, between married and cohabiting couples
include slightly lower income and education among cohabiting couples than married
couples (Smock 2000). However, cohabiting female partners show higher relative
income to male partners compared to married women (Brines & Joyner 1999).
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Nevertheless, structural constraints on cohabiting couples in terms of financial resources
may play a significant role in the nature of expense sharing for these couples. For
instance, cohabiting couples are less likely to own homes (Smock 2000), suggesting less
permanent financial investment or lower income in cohabiting relationships. These
demographic differences are just one aspect of possible differences and similarities
between marriage and cohabitation. The nature of the relationships may be
fundamentally different in terms of partners’ expectations. Short-term expectations and a
lack of “enforceable trust” within cohabiting relationships may limit couples’ joint
financial investments (Cherlin 2004).
Below I begin with a discussion of the literature exploring relationship differences
between married and cohabiting couples, noting issues of relationship stability, the
presence of children, work force participation, and gender specialization (Brines &
Joyner 1999; Edin & Kefalas 2005; Raley, Mattingly, & Bianchi 2006). Next, I make
note of research addressing the existing typologies of income pooling that provide a basis
for the importance of relative resources for couples’ allocation strategies (Pahl 1983,
1990; Kenney 2004, 2006; Vogler 2005). I hope that through an analysis of expense
sharing patterns, remaining differences by marital status and the presence of children, net
of relative resources and household socioeconomic status, will indicate some of the
important in ways in which relationship characteristics are also related to human capital
characteristics and decision-making processes about household expense payment.
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Differences in the Nature of Married and Cohabiting Relationships
Previous research on household allocative patterns has rightly focused on the
importance of relative and absolute resources in influencing the way in which couples
share income (Heimdal & Houseknecht 2003; Lundberg & Pollak 1994, 1996; Oropesa,
Landale, & Kenkre 2003; Treas 1993). However, another line of literature documents
relationship differences between married and cohabiting households, suggesting the
potential for a more autonomous, individualistic approach to relationships to influence
the way in which couples divide household expenses. Certainly the creation of individual
financial resources occurs within the context of these relationships. That is, an
individual’s decision to share income or increase or decrease labor force participation
may also depend on individual preferences for independence, the level of commitment in
the relationship, and the presence of children demanding financial or time resources.
A series of recent qualitative studies suggest that economic preferences play a role
in decisions to marry (Edin & Kefalas 2005; Edin & Reed 2005; Gibson-Davis, Edin, &
McLanahan 2005; Smock, Manning & Porter 2005). In fact, though movement from
cohabitation to marriage is the modal transition, many couples do not want to marry until
they have achieved a sense of economic stability (Smock, Manning, and Porter 2005).
Some low-income couples may depend on cohabitation to share expenses, but believe
that waiting to marry will produce a more stable relationship in the end (Edin & Kefalas
2005; Edin & Reed 2005; Gibson-Davis, Edin, & McLanahan 2005). This research
suggests that marital status, decisions to share household expenses, and income levels
may be tied together. Additionally, economic self-sufficiency is a source of power, and
many low income women may elect not to marry until they have reached self-sufficiency
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(Edin & Kefalas 2005; Edin & Reed 2005). This research suggests that some women,
low income women in particular, may be more likely to pay for household expenses with
their own money. Furthermore, those women paying for their own expenses may also be
more likely to cohabit, as they may privilege economic self-sufficiency over marriage.
Kenney’s (2006) study with the Fragile Families and Child Well-Being Survey supports
these qualitative findings suggesting that cohabiting couples with children are more likely
than married couples with children to use independent management systems, female-
controlled independent management systems in particular. Women in cohabiting
relationships with children may elect to have greater control over the household finances
than married women with children. Indeed, cohabiting couples in general may seek a
different type of relationship than married couples, one more focused on individualism,
egalitarianism, and independence (Brines & Joyner 1999; Casper and Bianchi 2002;
Vogler 2005). As a result, the characteristics that predict union dissolution among
married and cohabiting couples are not the same (Brines & Joyner 1999), and one might
expect that the characteristics that indicate patterns of expense sharing would differ as
well.
In addition, cohabitation may reflect a more temporary type of relationship than
marriage. Overall, married couple relationships show greater stability than cohabiting
couple relationships (Smock 2000). Cohabiting relationships tend to be short term, with
50 percent of cohabiting relationships lasting less than one year, including those that
transition to marriage (Bumpass and Lu 2000). Regardless of couples’ economic
arrangements (degree of gender specialization) the risks of dissolution are much higher
among cohabiting couples than among married couples (Brines & Joyner 1999). Stability
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can also be considered by the presence of previous marital disruption, which might
indicate previous difficulties associated with shared income. Couples with previous
marital disruptions are less likely to hold joint accounts, while older couples are more
likely to pool accounts (Heimdal and Houseknecht 2003; Treas 1993). In terms of
economic investment in the relationship, marital status provides an indicator of trust,
relationship stability, and legal obligations in personal relationships. Marriage offers an
“enforceable trust” to minimize risk taking, including on financial decisions such as
home ownership or gender specialization (Cherlin 2000:137). The social institution of
marriage yields a stronger bond than that of cohabitation (Eggebeen 2005; Nock 1995).
Cohabiting relationships have been characterized as representing lower levels of
commitment and a “normative ambiguity” in comparison to marriage (Oropesa, Landale,
and Kenkre 2003:910).
The lack of institutionalization of cohabitation compared to marriage offers one
explanation for the greater instability associated with cohabiting relationships. Trust and
reciprocity may be jeopardized by high rates of union dissolution, thus increasing
couples’ preference to maintain control over personal income. Among Puerto Rican
couples, Oropesa, Landale, Kenkre (2003: 919) find persistent relationship differences
between married and cohabiting couples despite controls for previous disruptions and
fertility, noting that the “marriage bond itself” affects decisions to combine income. It is
important to consider that the relationship between duration and sharing income works in
both directions. Couples that share expenses are less likely to experience union
dissolution, as income sharing “both reflects and reinforces the bond between partners”
(Oropesa, Landale, Kenkre 2003: 923). While a relationship exists between shared
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expenses and the duration and stability of the relationship, causality remains unclear.
Overall, this research indicates that cohabiting partners may have more temporary
expectations for the relationship and, as a result, may choose not to pool household
expenses or have one partner specialize in paid labor.
The nature of the relationship may also be reflected in couples’ tendencies to
specialize in market and non-market labor. Early models of household economics
suggest that married couples operate to maximize a single utility function, requiring
specialization, joint resources, and common preferences (Becker 1981). From this
perspective, married families are a single economic unit with one altruistic provider;
primary wage earning responsibilities rest with the male breadwinner. In short, the
efficiency provided by specialization gives couples a reason to get married (Becker
1981). Since the introduction of household economics, other work explores decisions to
marry, cohabit, or remain single in the face of larger economic conditions and labor force
participation (Oppenheimer 1994, 2000). Among married couples, dual earner
households are the predominant arrangement, with both partners working in 70 percent of
couples (Raley, Mattingly, and Bianchi 2006). Arrangements among cohabitors are less
clear. Recent research questions whether marital status affects the likelihood of
specialization. Specialization entails risk-taking behavior, and the loss of either partner
can have significant consequences for the functioning of the family unit (Oppenheimer
2000). Cohabiting couples may not specialize as time out of the paid labor market may
affect future earnings, and there are no legal protections for cohabiting couples (Ruijter,
Treas, & Cohen 2005). From a more emotional perspective, the degree to which married
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couples specialize may represent “joint investment” in the relationship, encouraging
relationship stability and shared expenses (Brines & Joyner 1999).
The Presence of Children, Relationship Stability, and Shared Household Expenses
The difference in stability between married and cohabiting relationships is
particularly true for partnerships with children. Children are a foundational aspect of
many relationships, and the decision to have children together may be indicative of a
stronger bond. Manning, Smock, and Majumdar (2004) find that 50 percent of children
born into cohabiting relationships will experience dissolution by age five, as opposed to
15 percent of children born into married relationships. The presence of children
generally increases the likelihood of joint bank accounts and pooled income, as the
presence of children represents a more significant relationship commitment (Treas 1993).
Many studies of household income allocation consider only couples with children
(Kenney 2004, 2006; Pahl 1983, 1995, 1996).
The way in which children influence expense sharing in the household may
depend on biological relationships to the child. Graeffe and Lichter (1999: 215) write,
“Cohabiting couple families and stepfamilies typically involve tenuous economic and
social relationships between the child and male parent.” Two biological parent
cohabiting households tend to behave more like married nuclear families than married
step families in terms of formal money management techniques (Kenney 2004). When
males in the household are not related to the children, mothers are more likely to
contribute more income to household and child-related expenses, supporting the
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possibility that the lack of a biological relationship to a child may affect the amount that
partner contributed to household expenses (Kenney 2004). This suggests that it is the act
of having a child together that affects family relationships and sharing, rather than the
presence of a child from a previous relationship.
The presence of children, particularly biological children, may also speak to
issues of gender specialization in the household. Relationships that include children may
be more likely to engage in gender specialization, affecting the way in which couples pay
household expenses. The number of dual earner families has grown dramatically since
1965, with about 41 percent of families with children featuring dual-earner couples in
2000 (Bianchi & Raley 2005). However, specialization in the household, in which one
partner (usually the male) performs market work and one partner (usually the female)
provides child care and household labor remains common, particularly within two-parent
households with young children present (Bianchi & Raley 2005).
Though children were more likely to predict specialization in married couples in
the 1970s and 1980s, they remain a push factor for specialization today (Raley,
Mattingly, & Bianchi 2006). More mothers are employed and working longer hours than
in previous years; however, mothers continue to decrease market work to accommodate
children more than frequently than fathers (Becker & Moen 1999; Maume 2006). Raley,
Mattingly, & Bianchi (2006) find that simply the presence of children increases the
likelihood that either partner will specialize in market work, rather than the husband
alone. On average, the effects of parenthood on employment vary for men and women.
Parenthood is associated with less sharing of household and market labor and increases
specialization (Coltrane 2000). Married mothers of preschool-age children remain
11
largely out of the labor force (Bianchi & Raley 2005). Furthermore, parenthood
increases maternal time spent on housework (Baxter, Hewitt, & Western 2005). With the
arrival of a child, fathers slightly increase work hours, while mothers decrease work
hours and increase housework (Sanchez & Thompson 1997). For married fathers, more
children correspond to a greater increase in fathers’ weekly work hours (Kaufman &
Uhlenberg 2000). Married fathers are more likely to be employed and work more hours
per week than married men without children (Kaufman & Uhlenberg 2000). While these
studies point to the way in which children may increase gender specialization, few of
these studies document differences across both marital status and the presence of
children, biological and non-biological.
Overall, this literature suggests that differences in the characteristics of married
and cohabiting couples as well as family structure may relate to different preferences for
shared household expenses. Socioeconomic differences in likelihood of cohabitation
may also be tied to the transition from cohabitation to marriage. Low income women
may prefer to maintain economic independence from cohabiting partners. Additionally,
perceived relationship stability, either as it is tied to children, step children, divorce, or
cohabitation may affect joint financial investments in the relationship. By controlling for
marital status, biological and the presence of a child not biologically related to one
partner, this study will better inform our understanding the financial arrangements of
married and cohabiting couples.
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Relative Resources: Income and Employment
Previous research on household income allocation patterns has been useful in
illustrating the importance of couples’ relative resources. This section addresses the wide
body of literature that has thus far framed much of the debate over partners’ access to
household resources. In an effort to explore power relationships and control over
household expenditures, Pahl (1983, 1995) created four typologies to describe patterns of
allocation in the household: whole wage system (male and female), allowance system,
shared management system, and the independent management system. The whole wage
system entails one partner as responsible for the management and expenditure of
household funds, usually from a common pot. The allowance system is when one partner
(usually male) gives a set amount of money over for household expenditure. The shared
management system is when all earnings are accessible from a common pot. Finally, the
independent management system implies that both partners are earning money and each
partner holds responsibility for specific household expenditures. These typologies do not
generally distinguish between dual- or single-earner couples, but certain systems (e.g., a
household allowance) may be more characteristic of single-earner couples than others.
More recently, others have used these typologies as a foundation to consider
gender equality in the household (Kenney 2004, 2006; Vogler 2005; Vogler, Brockmann
& Wiggins 2006). Kenney (2006) finds consistent differences between married and
cohabiting couples with children in the allocation of expenses. In fact, low-earning
women also seem to lack control over finances, exacerbating market inequalities (Kenney
2006). Pahl (1983) suggests that control is concentrated where money enters the
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household-- with the earner, and it is clear that access to partners’ earnings is not entirely
equitable.
It cannot be assumed that couples will simply pool their income; such an
assumption neglects individual interests, dual career couples, and the social relations (and
meaning) embedded in the exchange of money (Ishida 2003; Kochuyt 2004; Pahl 1983,
1995, 1996). Instead, household bargaining approaches consider couples’ decision-
making processes in household income. These models focus on the relative resources of
each partner as indicators of power differentials and reject the notion partners have equal
access to household income (Ishida 2003; Lundberg and Pollak 1994; Lundberg and
Pollak 1996; Pahl 1995; Schultz 1990; Thomas 1990; Treas 1993). This research
acknowledges the importance of employment and income in determining the extent to
which couples will pool economic resources.
Not surprisingly, income is a key indicator in terms of expense allocation
strategies. For instance, female resource management is more common in low income
households, while the male-managed systems are associated with higher income levels
(Pahl 1995). More recent research finds that Puerto Rican fathers with higher incomes in
both married and cohabiting households are more likely to engage in common pot
household finance organization, as opposed to an allowance, minimal support, or no
support (Oropesa, Landale, & Kenkre 2003). Conversely, the authors found that partners
with little or no income, lacking the ability, would not contribute to household expenses.
When women do not contribute to household earnings, they are less likely to use a
woman-controlled or equally controlled independent management system. They are
more likely to use a man-controlled shared management system (Kenney 2006). Women
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may experience wage inequality outside the household in the labor market as well as
unequal access to resources inside the household (Kenney 2006).
Research also suggests that employment affects the way in which couples share
income (Heimdal and Houseknecht 2003; Oropesa, Landale, Kenkre 2003). In both
married and cohabiting relationships, a male’s full time employment increases the
likelihood of paying for all expenses when his partner is unemployed, and male
unemployment increases the likelihood of minimal financial support (Heimdal and
Houseknecht 2003; Oropesa, Landale, & Kenkre 2003). Dual-earner partnerships
indicate a greater likelihood of mutual contributions to expenses, even if the couple does
not formally pool income (Oropesa, Landale, & Kenkre 2003). For married couples, dual
employment versus a single breadwinner suggests different forms of income
organization. Not surprisingly, dual-earner couples are more likely than single provider
couples to maintain separate bank accounts (Treas 1993), as both partners have access to
individual earnings. However, the role of employment in determining income allocation
systems is complicated. Kenney (2006: 375) finds that couples with a jointly pooled,
equal access system are a diverse group, “composed of both some of the most gender
specialized couples [male breadwinner-female homemaker] and the most egalitarian
couples in the [Fragile Families and Child Well-Being] sample.”
Contributions to the Literature and Hypotheses
While the influence of relative resources on couples’ income allocation patterns is
well-documented, the role of marital status and the presence of children are less clear.
Cohabiting relationships may be fundamentally different from married relationships,
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reflecting a desire for more autonomy and independence, lower levels of commitment or
reciprocity, or simply a need to achieve economic stability and make ends meet. In
addition, the presence of children, biological and non-biological, may relate to the way in
which couples share expenses. Children tend to lend stability to the relationship and
encourage joint investment either financially or through gender specialization. However,
the biological relationship of the child to both parents may complicate the way in which
partners share household expenses. Controlling for couples relative resources
(employment, income, and education) this paper will inform the relationship between
expense sharing and family structure in a nationally representative sample of married and
cohabiting couples with and without children. This paper will address both the
prevalence of financial specialization in couple households today as well as whether
marital status is related to gender specialization. I offer three testable hypotheses:
1) Consistent with studies of relative resources, income, education, and employment
will determine the way in which household expenses are shared. Couples with
more equal resources between the male and female partner are more likely to
share expenses or keep expenses separate than have one primary provider.
Couples with disproportionate resources will be more likely to have one partner
(the partner with greater resources) paying for the majority of household
expenses. A focus on relative resources argues that human capital characteristics
address the role of gender differences in household expense contributions more so
than differences in marital status or family structure.
2) Perspectives on relationship differences between married and cohabiting
households suggests that cohabiting partners may be less likely to engage in risk-
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taking behavior by specializing in market or non-market work. In addition,
cohabiting couples may prefer to maintain independence and autonomy in
meeting household expenses. Female partners in cohabiting couples may prefer
to maintain economic independence from male partners. Similarly, married
couples may have a more traditional perspective on specialization in marriage,
and possess the necessary levels of trust and legal accommodations to specialize.
The greater stability of married relationships lessens the risk of financial losses
associated with a decision to specialize. Married couples are more likely than
cohabiting couples to have a male partner accept sole responsibility for
household expenses. Cohabiting couples are more likely to pay for expenses
separately rather than share expenses, and they are more likely to have a female
provider than a male provider.
3) The presence of children increases non-market demands on couples’ time.
Couples with children are more likely to engage in specialization, either with a
male or female provider. However, the biological relationship of the child to each
partner may influence the degree to which partners share expenses. Couples with
a child biologically related to both partners are more likely to engage in
specialization, with a male or female primary provider rather than sharing
expenses or keeping expenses separate. If a child not biologically related to a
partner is present, the partner with the biological relationship to the child will be




This study uses data from wave three of the 2001 panel of the Survey of Income
and Program Participation (SIPP). The SIPP is intended to represent the non-
institutionalized population in the United States, including individuals living in group
quarters, with an over-sampling of low-income households.1 The 2001 panel of the SIPP
began wave one with 35,100 interviews in eligible living quarters in 322 primary
sampling units (PSUs). There were 89,141 people interviewed in wave one. An
additional 14,100 individuals are estimated to have entered the sample during the two
year period through births, marriages, and other reasons (see Census Bureau 2004).
Wave three and topical module three, the source of data on household expense sharing,
contains approximately 71,280 individuals. The topical module in wave three of the
survey includes 27,401 households.
Sample
Given the broad interpretations of household income in any given family, a
household-level analysis provides the best possible avenue to understand resource sharing
in married and cohabiting unions. The sample is limited to the reference person of
married or cohabiting couples; fifty-six of these households included same sex couples
and his/her partner. The direct measure of cohabitation is only available in terms of a
household member’s relationship to the householder, rather than, for instance, a
cohabiting couple living with a friend, who is noted as the survey householder. Thus, I
exclude couple who do not include the reference person. Those married or cohabiting
1 Cross-sectional person and household weights provide the means for adjusting to the non-institutionalized
population.
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householders that also have other individuals living with them will remain in the analysis.
The sample of heterosexual householders and their partners narrows the sample to 15,222
households. The final sample of heterosexual married and cohabiting couples includes
15,135 couples present in all four months of wave three.2
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is a household level variable constructed using
information on whether each individual over age 15 in the household paid particular
expenses with his/her own money. The questions, which are also used to determine
consumer units in the Consumer Expenditure Survey, are as follows:
“Now I am going to ask questions about the sharing of major expenses with the
household.
• Do you pay for all your housing expenses with your own money? [Yes or No]
• Do you pay for all your food expenses with your own money? [Yes or No]
• Do you pay for all your other living expenses such as clothing, transportation,
etc., with your own money? [Yes or No]
The responses to the above questions are recoded to create four mutually exclusive
categories of household expense sharing. There are 64 possible combinations for the
outcome variable -- two possible responses (yes or no) and six questions (three questions
for each partner). However, three particular combinations account for approximately 75
percent of couples’ responses to these questions.
First, if the male partner reports, “yes,” he pays for each type of expense (housing,
food, and other) with his own money and the female partner of the couple reports, “no,”
2 Appendix A shows the final sample as a portion of the original sample.
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she does not pay for any of these household expenses with her own money, then I classify
the household as a “male payer/provider” household.
If the female partner reports, “yes,” that she pays for all expenses (housing, food,
and other) with her own money and the male partner of the couple reports, “no,” he does
not pay for any household expenses with his own money (shares), I describe those
households as “female payer/provider” households.
The next category includes households where both partners answer “yes” to all
three questions about paying household expenses. Therefore, if both partners indicate
that they pay for all expenses with their own money, I categorize the household as
keeping expenses separate and independent.
The last category includes households in which the couples indicated that they
both contribute to household expenses, either by paying for different types of expenses or
sharing across all types. Therefore, this category includes households in which both
partners respond “no” to all of the above questions. It also includes couples in which the
male partner reports paying for expenses in one category and the female partner reports
paying for expenses in another category. For example, the male partner may pay for
housing while the female partner pays for food. Similarly, if the couple shares food
expenses, but the male or female partner reports “yes” to paying for housing or other,
then the household is also considered in this category. I describe these couples as “joint
contribution” households.
Table 1 shows the proportion of couples in each of these classifications across
each of the categories of household expenses: housing, food, or other expenses, as well as
the proportion of couples sharing for all expenses. The proportion of individuals that fall
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into any one of my classifications within each expense category is similar. Appendix A
shows the raw data of male and female partners’ responses to questions on household
expenses.
A Note on the Dependent Variable
There are a number of options in terms of how to code the payment of household
expenses. This paper defines providers based on who pays for all of the household
expenses. The definition of expense sharing proposed in this analysis is different than the
formal management techniques described by Pahl (1989, 1995) and others (Kenney 2004,
2006; Treas 1993). First, while the issue of control can be inferred in the male and
female provider categories, as the person providing the bulk of income likely controls
spending money and income allocation, this question cannot test the level of control that
each partner has over household expenses, but instead provides an indicator of the type of
financial responsibility each partner perceives. Second, the SIPP does not ask non-
married couples questions on joint bank accounts; this broader definition of expense
sharing rather than banking is more applicable for all participants. These data also offer
an opportunity to consider married and cohabiting households both with and without
children present. These three questions on household expenses represent the means to
understand whether all individuals in a household indeed comprise a single “consumer
unit;” that is, whether the household spending patterns reflect that of multiple families in
one household or a single household unit (Short and Smeeding 2005).
In qualitative focus groups to understand how individuals understood these
particular questions, researchers found that these measures of expense sharing were not
always clear for couples. Some respondents perceived their partners’ income as their
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“own money,” while others counted only their own income, and still more others did not
consider loans or government subsidies as their “own money” (Short and Smeeding
2005). As a result, some couples that report paying for expenses separately, may in fact
perceive that their own money includes both of their incomes. These varied definitional
interpretations are hard to avoid, but they offer unique value to this study. The notion of
individual perceptions of how finances are shared allows the researcher to infer levels of
fiscal responsibility over finances across marital status. In focus groups on these
questions, Short and Smeeding (2005: 14) find that “many individuals in families do
consider themselves to be independent economic agents.” This study is focused on
understanding how such perceptions of individual or shared expenses vary between
cohabiting and married couples and the factors that might account for some of this
variation. The household-level analysis outlined above offers a unique approach to
addressing these issues of perceived expense sharing.
Explanatory Variables
Marital status is the main explanatory variable in the analysis. Married is coded
where cohabiting households=0 and married households=1. The SIPP has the benefit of
using an actual rather than an inferred definition of cohabitation; this direct measure is
less likely to overstate cohabitation rates (Baughman, Dickert-Conline, & Houser 2002).
Presence of a child is based on four mutually exclusive categories. The presence
of a biological child is a dummy variable indicates that a child biologically related to
both partners lives in the household. Non-biological child is a dummy variable indicating
that a child lives in the household that is not biologically related to one of the partners.
Both a biological child and a step child is a dummy variable indicating that both types of
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children are present. Finally, no child in the household is the reference category where
the couple has no children. The bulk of the step children in the sample (approximately 80
percent) are living with their biological mothers.
One dummy variable provides a limited measure of relationship stability.
Previous disruptions are defined by dummy variables indicating whether either partner
has ever been divorced. Divorced=1 when either couple reports a previous marriage and
divorce.
Control Variables
Relative resources of each of the partners are also key explanatory variables.
Relative resources are based on education, employment, income, and age. Education is
coded based on five dummy variables that indicate education levels: less than high
school, high school, some college, bachelor’s degree, and professional or doctorate
degree); female greater education=1 where the female partner in the married or
cohabiting couple holds a higher educational level than the male partner. For example, if
the female partner has a college degree and the male partner has a high school degree,
female education greater=1. Similarly, male education greater is coded one when the
male partner has a higher educational level than the female partner. Equal education is
the reference group.
Employment is coded based on the average hours per week worked during the
previous month at the individual’s primary job, unless they were coded as moonlighting.
Individuals moonlighting have hours included from both their first and second job
reported for that month. Individuals who were not employed in the previous month were
coded as working zero hours. Responses were recoded to the 99th percentile, where
23
individuals working more than 80 hours in one week were coded as working 80 hours.
The female to male employment hours ratio represents a ratio of female hours worked
divided by the total male hours worked.
The female income proportion represents proportion of the female partner’s
income to total household income, and thus ranges from 0 to 1. Household income,
measured in thousands, is an annual approximation based on the sum of earnings received
in each month of the wave and then tripled to approximate annual income.
Male-female age difference is an integer variable that indicates the years of age
difference between the male and female partners. If the male-female age difference is
negative, it indicates that the female partner is older than the male partner.
Household characteristics -- age, race, education, and employment -- will be used
as controls for socioeconomic status and household resources. Householder age is a
continuous variable, representing the age of the oldest partner, ranging from 18 to 85.
Multivariate models also include a control for age squared as the relationship of age to
expense may change among older, retired couples. Race is measured in four mutually
exclusive categories: non-Hispanic white (reference category), non-Hispanic black,
Hispanic or Latino, and other, which includes Asian, American Indian and Native
Alaskan. A dummy variable indicates a multiracial couple. Multiracial couple=1 when
partners vary on one of five race/ethnicity categories: non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic
black, Hispanic, Asian, or American Indian/Native Alaskan. As noted above, five
dummy variables indicate education: less than high school, high school (reference
category), some college, bachelor’s degree, and professional or doctorate degree. The
household education reflects the highest education of the two partners.
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A sum of couples’ total weekly hours is used to create a control for the couple’s
employment status. The variable is recoded to the 99th percentile, so that couples
working more than a total of 125 hours per week are coded as 125 hours per week.
Income is measured using a ratio of the annualized household income (as
discussed above) to an annualized household poverty threshold. The annualized
household poverty threshold is calculated by summing the household poverty level for
each month of wave 3 and multiplying that figure by three. The household poverty
threshold is provided in SIPP data and takes into account family size, number of children,
and presence of the elderly (for 1-2 person households).
Method
Descriptive statistics and nested multinomial logistic regression models are used
to shed light on the relationships between marital status, children, relative resources, and
couples’ perceptions of responsibility for household expenses. Initial analyses focus on
the characteristics of the populations across each of type of expense sharing: female
provider, male provider, separate expenses, and sharing. In an effort to address major
explanatory factors of couples’ approaches to sharing household expenses, I use nested,
multinomial logistic regression.
Results
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for all households in the sample for the
independent and dependent variables. The majority of married and cohabiting couples
make joint contributions to household expenses (34 percent) or keep expenses separate
(35 percent), while just 3 percent are female payer/provider households, and 28 percent
are male payer/provider households. This suggests that some form of mutual
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contribution to household expenses is most common. Table 2 also offers bivariate
relationships across each of the modes of expense sharing. A larger proportion of male
provider couples are married with biological children in household than any of the other
three groups; cohabiting couples are more common among the other arrangements. The
proportion of cohabiting couples among female payer/provider couples, couples making
joint contributions, and couples keeping separate expense is largely similar.
Nine percent of female provider couples have a child not biologically related to one of
the partners present, compared to between three and five percent in each of the other
expense sharing arrangements. A higher proportion (37 percent) of female provider
couples has experienced divorce than those in male provider or separate expense
households, while a lower proportion of male provider households have experienced
divorce than any other expense sharing type. Bivariate relationships suggest that male
provider families have a proportionately different family structure composition than other
modes of expense sharing in terms of marital status, previous disruptions, and the
presence of biological children.
There are also relative resource and socioeconomic differences across expense
sharing arrangements. Female payer/provider couples have a larger proportion of women
with a greater level of education than their partners, compared to male payer/providers
and couples with separate-expense arrangements. Conversely, 34 percent of male
payer/provider households have men with greater levels of education than their partners
compared to 25 percent in joint contribution arrangements, 28 percent in separate
expense arrangements, and 21 percent in female payer/provider households. In line with
this, the female-to-male hours worked ratio in female payer/provider households are three
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times the mean of that across other modes of expense sharing. While women in female
payer/provider relationships work longer hours per week on average than women in other
expense sharing arrangements, their male partners work more hours on average than
women in male payer/provider relationships. Finally, female and male provider
households have adjusted household income levels between 12 and 25 percent lower on
average than separate and shared expense arrangements.
Table 3 provides mean household characteristics by marital status. Married
couples are fairly evenly distributed across male payer/provider, joint contribution and
separate expense arrangements at 29, 33, and 35 percent respectively. The bulk of
cohabiting households (44 percent) contribute jointly to expenses, followed by 35 percent
in separate expense arrangements, 16 percent in male payer/provider households, and 4
percent in female payer/provider households. Twice as many married couples are two-
biological parent families compared to cohabiting couples, and, conversely, three times as
many cohabiting as married couples have a child not biologically related to one partner in
the household. All of these differences across marital status are statistically significant,
as noted in the table. There is no statistical difference between the percentage of married
and cohabiting couples in which both partners reporting paying for all of their expense
with their own money.
Supporting previous research, Table 3 also shows that female partners in
cohabiting couples have greater relative resources, on average, than female partners in
married couples. A similar proportion of married and cohabiting couples have equal
education. Women and men in cohabiting relationships work more hours per week
compared to married couples. Women in cohabiting relationships also work more hours
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per week on average than their partners compared to married couples. A greater
proportion of married female partners earn less than 25 percent of total household
income, while a greater proportion of cohabiting female partners earn more than 50
percent of household income. A similar proportion of married and cohabiting female
partners earn between 25 and 50 percent of household income, suggesting that both types
of households include dual-earner arrangements.
Supporting previous research on general socioeconomic differences between
married couples and cohabitors, married couples have higher average income per
household adult and a higher proportion of partners with a college education or greater.
Some of these income and education differences may be partially accounted for by the
fact that married couples are ten years older on average. A greater proportion of married
couples are White or Asian, while a greater proportion of cohabiting couples are Black,
Latino, or American Indian or Native Alaskan.
Although bivariate relationships suggest variation in modes of expense sharing
between married and cohabiting couples as well as family structure differences, it is
unclear whether these relationships persist net of relative resources and household
controls. Multinomial logistic regression results include three models: the first model
introduces marital status, the second model includes family structure and relationship
characteristics, and the third model includes controls for relative resources and household
socioeconomic status.
Table 4 shows multinomial logistic regressions with male payer/provider couples,
where male partners report paying for all expenses with their own money and female
partner report that they do not, as the comparison category. In Model 1 of Table 4,
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married couples are more likely to have a male payer/provider than any other expense
arrangement.
In Model 2, the addition of controls for the presence of children and previous
divorce slightly reduce the coefficients associated with marital status. Differences across
marital status persist in Model 2. For example, the presence of a child biologically
related to both partners increases the odds that the household will be a male provider
household compared to any of the other arrangements. The presence of a child not
biologically related to a partner increases the odds that the household will be a female
provider household rather than any of the other three arrangements (results not shown for
other comparison groups). In addition, households with two-biological parents are less
likely to be any other arrangement compared to a male provider arrangement. Finally, a
previous divorce for either partner increases the odds of a female payer/provider, couples
contributing jointly, or couples reporting they both pay for expenses with their own
money compared to male provider households. These findings support bivariate
analyses. Similarly, Model 2 shows no statistical differences in the relationship with
divorce across female provider, separate expense couples, and joint contribution expense
arrangements (results not shown).
Model 3 introduces controls for partners’ relative resources, socioeconomic
status, and household characteristics. While relative resources improve the explanatory
power of the model, differences across family structure and marital status among modes
of expense sharing persist. In fact, with the introduction of relative resources and
household controls, the coefficients associated with marital status remain largely the
same among separate and joint expense arrangements. The presence of a married couple
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increases the likelihood of a male payer/provider compared to all other modes of expense
sharing. In addition, married couples also increase the likelihood of an arrangement in
which both partners report paying for all their own expenses (separate expense
arrangements) compared to joint contribution arrangements (results shown in Appendix
B). The biological relationship of the child to the partner also continues to show a
relationship with mode of expense sharing. The presence of a child not biologically
related to a partner increases the likelihood of a female provider household compared to
any other arrangement (results for other comparison groups not shown). This suggests
that for the more traditional male payer/provider households, the biological relationship
of the child to the provider may play a larger role in determining how expenses are shared
rather than the simply the presence of a child. There is no statistical difference in the
relationship of two-biological parent households between couples with a male
payer/provider, joint contribution arrangements, and couples that both report paying for
expenses with their own money. The final model also shows no statistical difference in
the relationship of previous divorce to any choice of expense sharing relationship.
As indicated by previous research, women working more hours per week and
earning larger proportion of household income increase the likelihood of a female
payer/provider household compared to any other expense sharing arrangement (results for
other comparison categories not shown). In fact, the odds ratios associated with women’s
income have a significant effect on couples’ arrangements. Households with an older
male partner are more likely to be male payer/provider households compared to separate
or joint contribution arrangements. There are no statistical differences across relative
resources in the relationship between households with separate and joint contribution
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expense arrangements, with the exception of higher male education (compared to equal
education) which increases the likelihood of separate expenses compared to joint
contribution (results not shown). Households with couples working more hours and a
higher income to poverty ratio are more likely to have joint contribution or separate
expense arrangements compared to male payer/provider arrangements. This contradicts
previous research on typologies of income sharing that suggest that high income
households are more likely to be whole wage models. The relative resources of partners
may have a greater bearing on the ways in which partners share household expenses.
Finally, compared to White couples, households with Black couples are more likely to
both report paying for all expenses with their own money than a male payer/provider
arrangement. Compared to White couples, households with a Hispanic/Latino couple are
more likely to have a male provider than both report contributing jointly to household
expenses, and households with an Asian couple are less likely to report separate expenses
than a male payer/provider. These results suggest that there may be some racial
differences in the way that couples perceive their finances.
Discussion
With the rise in cohabitation and dual-earner couples, the modes by which
couples perceive household expenses can indicate potential differences in married and
cohabiting relationships. Net of relative resources and socioeconomic status, results
suggest that married couples indeed appear to have more traditional arrangements in that
they are more likely to have a male partner report paying all household expenses. Female
partners in married couples may be more inclined to reduce market labor, particularly
when children are present. Results also suggest that net of relative resources, the
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biological relationship of the child to the couple is related to the way couples perceive
paying household expenses. Two biological parent couples also take on a more
traditional gender specialized model in that they are more likely to perceive a single male
payer/provider as responsible for household expenses. On the other hand, the presence of
a child not related to one partner increases the likelihood that the couple will adopt a
female payer/provider expense arrangement compared to any other arrangement.
While relative resources clearly influence the way in which couples perceive the
payment of household expenses, relationship characteristics, particularly marital status
and family structure, also play a role. Decisions to work longer hours or spend more time
in child care are made in the context of the relationship. In showing differences across
marital status and the biological relationship of children, this analysis supports the
hypothesis that the nature of the relationship is also important for making income
allocation decisions.
As suggested by research on couples’ relative resources, households in which the
female is employed more hours and earns a larger proportion of household income are
more likely to have a female payer/provider than any other arrangement. Male
payer/provider households show a negative relationship with women’s income as a
proportion of total household income compared to those making joint contributions or
those perceiving separate expenses. These results support findings emphasizing
household bargaining and the role of income and employment in determining
specialization and market work (Kenney 2004, 2006; Oropesa, Landale, and Kenkre
2003; Treas 1993). However, it is more complicated; relative resources do not
necessarily predict the particular arrangement at which couples arrive. For instance,
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women’s relative employment and earnings seem to have little effect on the likelihood
joint contribution compared to a arrangements in which the couples both perceive paying
expenses with their own money. In fact, married couples are less likely to share expenses
than both perceive paying expenses with their own money, and couples with a child not
biologically related to a partner are more likely to be female payer/provider households
than both perceive paying expenses with their own money. It is possible that paying with
your own money reflects joint accounts for married individuals. These may be more
egalitarian households in which women perceive household income as their own income.
In many ways, the separate expenses arrangement is more similar to male provider
households than other arrangements. These results suggest that married couples may be
more likely to either engage in traditional gender specialization with men working more
hours or both perceive that the household income is their own money, regardless of
relative resources. The perception of equitably shared income may be different among
some married and cohabiting couples.
At the same time, women in cohabiting relationships, particularly low-income
women, may prefer to remain more autonomous and self-sufficient (Edin & Kefalas
2005). As a result, women may prefer to delay marriage or limit their investment in
gender specialization, particularly in cases when their partner may be struggling with
regular employment and earnings (Edin & Kefalas 2005; Edin & Reed 2005; Gibson-
Davis, Edin, & McLanahan 2005; Smock, Manning & Porter 2005). Results indicate that
cohabiting households are more likely to have a female payer/provider or have both
partners report joint contributions to household expenses than either a male
provider/payer or an arrangement in which both partners reporting paying for everything
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with their own money. This supports the possibility that joint accounts or gender
specialization may reduce women’s autonomy or control, or that perhaps these
arrangements are riskier in terms of future wages, employment, and access to both
partners’ earnings. As cohabitation tends to represent a relatively short-term relationship,
female payer/provider or joint contribution arrangements may better suit couples’
preferences. At the same time, these households may also be at a distinct disadvantage
to male payer/provider households as a result of wage and labor market gender
inequalities (Kenney 2006).
In addition, the presence of children adds an interesting nuance to understandings
of expense sharing arrangements. The presence of children (regardless of biological
relationship) is positively associated with both male and female provider households,
compared to couples that indicate a joint contribution to expenses. This is supported by
previous findings that couples must change employment patterns to accommodate
children, though not necessarily in a gender specific manner (Raley, Mattingly, &
Bianchi 2006). Specialization related to the presence of children is not necessarily in the
traditional model of male breadwinner, female homemaker. Instead, the presence of
children positively predicts that households will have one person primarily responsible
for paying household expenses in order to accommodate children’s needs. While a more
exacting model detailing children’s specific biological ties to each partner would inform
the analysis, some implications may be intuited. As most children live with their mother
following relationship disruption, the presence of a child not biologically related to one
partner likely indicates a biological relationship with the mother. Households with a
child not biologically related to one partner are less likely to be male breadwinners and
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more likely to be female provider households. In fact, the presence of a two biological
parent couple increases the likelihood of a male provider compared to joint contribution
or female provider arrangements. These results indicate a layer of complexity on the
finding that women are consistently the parent to reduce work hours and increase child
care (Becker & Moen 1999; Maume 2006). These results suggest that male partners’
willingness to become the sole provider for the child may vary with blood ties. And, in
general, the biological parent of the child may be the most willing or most likely to
perceive a role as primary provider.
This study confirms the importance of couples’ relative resources in
understanding the way in which household expenses are paid. However, perceptions of
household expenses are also made within the context of a particular relationship, and
results support an understanding that takes into account marital status and children’s
biological relationships to partners as well as employment, education, and income
differences. The potential for the exacerbation of income inequalities based on the ways
in which economic resources are shared within the household should be explored further.
This paper offers a starting point for additional consideration of expense sharing in
married and cohabiting households. Future research may explore gender equity in access
to money for particular types of expenses, the specific ways in which couples perceive
partners’ income as household income, and preferences for control over expenses within
particular relationship types and family structures.
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Appendix A: Sample Attrition
People present in the last month of Wave 3 71,280
Households present in the last month of Wave 3 27,401
Married and Cohabiting Households 15,222
Households present in all four months of Wave 3 15,135
Appendix B: Male and Female Partner Reports of Expense Payments
Pay Own Do Not Pay Own
5,443 4,905
0.36 0.32
776 4,011 Total Households
0.05 0.27 15,135
Pay Own Do Not Pay Own
5,670 4,708
0.37 0.31
795 3,962 Total Households
0.05 0.26 15,135
Pay Own Do Not Pay Own
6,241 4,527
0.41 0.30
707 3,660 Total Households
0.05 0.24 15,135
Pay Own
Do Not Pay Own
Male





Do Not Pay Own
Female
Individual Reports of FOOD Expense Payments with Own Money, N with Percent of Total
Individual Reports of HOUSING Expense Payments with Own Money, N with Percent of Total
Male
Pay Own
Do Not Pay Own
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Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE
Marital Status
Married -0.34 * 0.15 0.59 *** 0.09 -0.22 *** 0.07 -0.23 0.15 0.46 *** 0.09 -0.20 ** 0.07
Relationship Characteristics
Bio. child of both partners present 0.08 0.10 0.40 *** 0.04 -0.06 0.04
Step child present 0.65 *** 0.17 -0.07 0.11 -0.03 0.09
Biological and step child present 0.67 ** 0.20 0.49 *** 0.11 -0.13 0.11









Income to poverty ratio














Constant -1.97 *** 0.14 -0.79 *** 0.09 0.17 * 0.07 -2.24 *** 0.16 -0.84 *** 0.09 0.16 * 0.07
-2 Log Likelihood
Pseudo R2
N=15,135 Married and Cohabiting Households
Note: Omitted categories: no children in the household, equal education, high school graduates, and white householders.
*p<05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Source: 2001 Panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation.



















Appendix C: Estimated Coefficients from Multinomial Logistic Regressions Predicting Expense Sharing Arrangements (Separate






Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE
Marital Status
Married 0.07 0.17 0.45 *** 0.10 -0.24 ** 0.08
Relationship Characteristics
Biological child of both partners present 0.09 0.12 0.04 0.06 -0.05 0.05
Step child present 0.57 ** 0.19 -0.18 0.12 -0.01 0.09
Biological and step child present 0.46 * 0.22 0.13 0.12 -0.07 0.11
Ever divorced 0.17 0.11 -0.06 0.05 0.03 0.05
Controls
Relative Resources
Male-female age diff -0.01 0.01 0.02 *** 0.00 0.00 0.00
Female Hrs/Male Hrs 0.02 *** 0.00 -0.01 *** 0.00 0.00 0.00
Female inc. as a proportion of household inc. 2.18 *** 0.19 -3.51 *** 0.12 0.03 0.09
Male education greater -0.16 0.13 0.10 0.06 -0.12 * 0.05
Female education greater 0.02 0.12 -0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05
Socioeconomic Characteristics
Income to poverty ratio -0.06 ** 0.02 -0.02 *** 0.01 0.00 0.01
Less than high school 0.06 0.21 0.04 0.10 -0.03 0.10
Some college -0.02 0.13 -0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
BA -0.06 0.15 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.06
BA+ -0.05 0.18 -0.04 0.08 0.00 0.07
Household Characteristics
Oldest partner -0.02 0.02 0.03 ** 0.01 0.01 0.01
Oldest partner2 0.00 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total weekly hours worked by couple -0.01 ** 0.00 -0.01 *** 0.00 0.00 * 0.00
Race
Multiracial couple 0.10 0.18 -0.05 0.10 0.02 0.08
Black -0.01 0.16 -0.17 0.09 -0.22 ** 0.07
Hispanic/Latino 0.11 0.16 -0.03 0.08 -0.21 ** 0.08
Asian 0.11 0.27 0.28 * 0.12 0.14 0.11
American Indian/Native Alaskan 0.36 0.41 -0.28 0.26 0.13 0.21
Constant -2.20 *** 0.51 0.45 0.25 -0.19 0.37 0.22
-2 Log Likelihood
Pseudo R2
N=15,135 Married and Cohabiting Households







Appendix C Continued: Estimated Coefficients from Multinomial Logistic Regressions Predicting
Expense Sharing Arrangements (Separate Expenses as Comparison Category) with Standard Error
Source: 2001 Panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation.








N % Total N % Total N % Total N % Total
Female Pays All Own Exp. 776 5.13 795 5.25 707 4.67 539 3.56
Male Pays All Own Exp. 4,905 32.41 4,708 31.11 4,527 29.91 4,187 27.66
Both Pay Separately 5,443 35.96 5,670 37.46 6,241 41.24 5,293 34.97
Both Contribute to Exp. 4,011 26.50 3,962 26.18 3,660 24.18 5,116 33.80
Table 1: Distribution of the Dependent Variable Across Each Expense Category, UnWeighted
Housing Expenses Food Expenses Other Expenses All Expenses
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Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Dependent Variable
Female Payer/Provider 0.03 0.18 0 1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Male Payer/Provider 0.28 0.46 0 1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Joint Contributions 0.34 0.48 0 1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Both Pay with Own
Money (Separate)
0.35 0.48 0 1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Explanatory Variables
Family Structure and Relationship
Cohabiting 0.07 0.26 0 1 0.09 a 0.29 0.04 bc 0.20 0.09 c 0.29 0.07 0.26
Married 0.93 0.26 0 1 0.91 a 0.29 0.96 bc 0.20 0.91 c 0.29 0.93 0.26
Biological Child of
Both Partners Present 0.45 0.50 0 1 0.40 a 0.49 0.53 bc 0.51 0.41 0.50 0.43 0.50
Child Not Bio. Related
to One Partner Present 0.05 0.21 0 1 0.09 abc 0.29 0.03 bc 0.18 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22
Both Biological and
Step Child Present 0.04 0.19 0 1 0.06 abc 0.24 0.04 b 0.21 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18
Household 0.47 0.51 0 1 0.44 ab 0.49 0.39 bc 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.49 0.51




Difference 2.39 5.00 -35.00 38.00 2.11 5.22 2.60 c 4.99 2.36 5.06 2.29 4.93
Relative Education
Equal Education 0.46 0.51 0 1 0.47 0.50 0.46 0.51 0.46 0.51 0.47 0.50
Male Education Greater 0.29 0.46 0 1 0.21 ac 0.40 0.34 bc 0.48 0.25 c 0.44 0.28 0.45
Greater 0.25 0.44 0 1 0.32 ac 0.46 0.19 bc 0.40 0.28 c 0.46 0.26 0.44
Relative
Hours 5.06 13.24 0.00 80.00 15.15 abc 20.43 2.53 bc 9.15 5.47 13.73 5.71 13.93
Avg. Employed Female
Hours per Week 36.12 11.36 1.00 99.00 38.95 abc 9.34 31.44 bc 13.59 36.75 10.83 37.10 10.55
Avg. Employed Male
Hours per Week 42.74 10.75 1.00 110.00 39.89 abc 13.06 43.69 bc 11.11 42.50 10.85 42.36 10.07
Relative Income
Income 0.31 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.55 abc 0.32 0.16 bc 0.21 0.36 0.23 0.35 0.23
Dummy Variables, Female Income/HH Income
<= 25 % HH Income 0.44 0.50 0 1 0.21 abc 0.41 0.72 bc 0.46 0.33 0.48 0.34 0.48
Income 0.35 0.49 0 1 0.26 abc 0.44 0.21 bc 0.42 0.43 0.50 0.41 0.50
Income 0.16 0.37 0 1 0.21 ab 0.40 0.05 bc 0.23 0.19 0.40 0.20 0.41
>= 75% HH Income 0.05 0.23 0 1 0.31 abc 0.46 0.02 bc 0.14 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.22
Household Socioeconomic Status
HH Income to Poverty
Ratio
4.47 4.02 0.00 59.94
3.56 abc 3.04 4.06 bc 4.06 4.74 4.00 4.63 4.05
Adjusted HH Income $25,891 23,621 $0 $393,578 $20,699 abc 17,865 $23,528 bc 23,591 $27,402 23,511 $26,830 24,047
Less than High School 0.06 0.24 0 1 0.07 0.25 0.08 bc 0.27 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.23
High School 0.23 0.42 0 1 0.26 0.44 0.23 0.43 0.22 0.42 0.23 0.42
College/Vocational 0.33 0.48 0 1 0.34 0.47 0.30 bc 0.47 0.34 0.48 0.33 0.48
College 0.23 0.43 0 1 0.20 0.40 0.24 c 0.44 0.24 0.43 0.22 0.42
Greater than College 0.16 0.37 0 1 0.13 0.33 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.37 0.17 0.38
Household Characteristics
Oldest Partner 49.13 15.34 18.00 85.00 46.83 bc 14.69 48.22 bc 14.97 49.69 15.43 49.55 15.57
Total Couple Wkly
Work Hrs
50.84 35.75 0.00 125.00
49.20 abc 32.22 41.91 bc 31.52 55.53 c 37.10 53.62 36.57
Assistance 0.15 0.36 0 1 0.32 bc 0.46 0.27 bc 0.45 0.19 c 0.40 0.00 0.00
Householder's
Multiracial Couple 0.06 0.25 0 1 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.25
White 0.79 0.42 0 1 0.75 b 0.43 0.77 b 0.43 0.81 c 0.40 0.78 0.42
Black 0.07 0.26 0 1 0.10 ab 0.29 0.06 c 0.24 0.06 c 0.25 0.08 0.28
Hispanic/Latino 0.10 0.30 0 1 0.11 b 0.31 0.13 bc 0.34 0.08 c 0.27 0.10 0.30
Asian 0.04 0.19 0 1 0.04 0.19 0.04 c 0.21 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.18
Amer. Indian/Native 0.01 0.09 0 1 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.09
Separate
(N=5,239)
a Association significantly different from male provider (p<.01), b shared expenses (p<.01), c separate expenses (p<.01)
Joint
Contributions
Source: 2001 Panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation.








Table 3: Mean Household Characteristics by Marital Status, Weighted
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Dependent Variable
Female Payer/Provider 0.03 0.18 0.04 * 0.20
Male Payer/Provider 0.29 0.46 0.16 *** 0.37
Joint Contributions 0.33 0.48 0.44 *** 0.49
Both Pay with Own Money
(Separate)
0.35 0.48 0.35 NS 0.47
Explanatory Variables
Family Structure and Relationship
Cohabiting -- -- -- --
Married -- -- -- --
Two Biological Parent Couple 0.47 0.51 0.19 *** 0.39
Child Not Biologically Related
to One Partner Present 0.04 0.20 0.13 *** 0.33
Both Biological and Step Child
Present 0.03 0.19 0.07 *** 0.25
No Children in the Household 0.46 0.51 0.62 *** 0.48
Divorce 0.28 0.46 0.52 *** 0.49
Control Variables
Relative Resources
Male-Female Age Difference 2.41 4.84 2.20 NS 6.70
Relative Education
Equal Education 0.47 0.51 0.45 NS 0.49
Male Education Greater 0.29 0.46 0.23 *** 0.42
Female Education Greater 0.24 0.44 0.31 *** 0.46
Relative Employment
Female Hours/Male Hours 4.97 13.16 6.29 ** 14.06
Avg. Employed Female Hours 35.99 11.58 37.40 ** 8.86
Avg. Employed Male Hours per
Week 42.83 10.83 41.73 ** 9.75
Relative Income
Female Income/HH Income 0.31 0.25 0.37 *** 0.26
Dummy Variables, Female Income/HH Income
<= 25 % HH Income 0.45 0.50 0.34 *** 0.47
> 25 <=50 % HH Income 0.35 0.49 0.36 NS 0.48
> 50 < 75 % HH Income 0.15 0.36 0.22 *** 0.41
>= 75% HH Income 0.05 0.22 0.08 *** 0.26
Household Socioeconomic Status
HH Income to Poverty Ratio 4.51 4.04 3.88 *** 3.73
Adjusted HH Income $26,120 23,732 $22,866 *** 21,985
Less than High School 0.06 0.24 0.08 ** 0.27
High School 0.22 0.42 0.30 *** 0.45
Some College/Vocational 0.32 0.47 0.39 *** 0.48
College 0.24 0.43 0.16 *** 0.37
Greater than College 0.16 0.38 0.07 *** 0.25
Household Characteristics
Oldest Partner 49.88 15.25 39.28 *** 12.97
Total Couple Wkly Work Hrs 49.92 35.87 62.93 *** 31.84
Received Outside Assistance 0.15 0.37 0.09 *** 0.29
Householder's Race
Multiracial Couple 0.06 0.24 0.13 *** 0.33
White 0.79 0.41 0.72 *** 0.44
Black 0.07 0.26 0.10 *** 0.29
Hispanic/Latino 0.10 0.30 0.13 *** 0.34
Asian 0.04 0.19 0.02 * 0.15
Amer. Indian/Native Alaskan 0.01 0.09 0.02 *** 0.15
Tests of significance represent t-tests of population means between married and
cohabiting households where *p<05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Source: 2001 Panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation.
Married (N=14,015) Cohabiting (N=1,120)
42
Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE
Marital Status
Married -0.93 *** 0.16 -0.59 *** 0.09 -0.81 *** 0.09 -0.69 *** 0.16 -0.46 *** 0.09 -0.66 *** 0.09
Relationship Characteristics
Biological child of both partners present -0.32 ** 0.10 -0.40 *** 0.04 -0.46 *** 0.04
Step child present 0.73 *** 0.18 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.11
Both biological and step child present 0.18 0.20 -0.49 *** 0.11 -0.62 *** 0.11









Income to poverty ratio














Constant -1.18 *** 0.15 0.79 *** 0.09 0.96 *** 0.09 -1.40 *** 0.17 0.84 *** 0.09 1.00 *** 0.09
-2 Log Likelihood
Pseudo R2
N=15,135 Married and Cohabiting Households
Note: Omitted categories: no children in the household, equal education, high school graduates, and white householders.
*p<05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Table 4: Estimated Coefficients from Multinomial Logistic Regressions Predicting Expense Sharing Arrangements (Male Payer/Provider as Comparison Category)
with Standard Error





Model 1 Model 2
Female Provider Separate Expenses Joint Contribution Female Provider Separate Expenses Joint Contribution
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Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE
Marital Status
Married -0.39 * 0.18 -0.45 *** 0.10 -0.69 *** 0.10
Relationship Characteristics
Biological child of both partners present 0.05 0.12 -0.04 0.06 -0.10 0.06
Step child present 0.75 *** 0.20 0.18 0.12 0.16 0.12
Both biological and step child present 0.33 0.23 -0.13 0.12 -0.21 0.13
Ever divorced 0.22 0.12 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.06
Controls
Relative Resources
Male-Female Age Diff -0.02 * 0.01 -0.02 ** 0.00 -0.01 * 0.00
Female Hrs/Male Hrs 0.02 *** 0.00 0.01 ** 0.00 0.00 * 0.00
Female/HH Ratio 5.69 *** 0.21 3.51 *** 0.12 3.54 *** 0.12
Male Ed. Greater -0.26 0.14 -0.10 0.06 -0.22 *** 0.06
Female Ed. Greater 0.08 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.06
Socioeconomic Characteristics
Income to poverty ratio -0.04 0.02 0.02 ** 0.01 0.02 ** 0.01
Less than high school 0.03 0.22 -0.04 0.10 -0.06 0.10
Some college 0.03 0.13 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.06
BA -0.15 0.16 -0.09 0.07 0.02 0.07
BA+ -0.01 0.19 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.08
Household Characteristics
Oldest partner -0.05 * 0.02 -0.03 ** 0.01 -0.02 0.01
Oldest partner2 0.00 * 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00
Total weekly hours worked by couple 0.00 0.00 0.01 *** 0.00 0.01 *** 0.00
Race
Multiracial couple 0.14 0.19 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.10
Black 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.09 -0.04 0.09
Hispanic/Latino 0.14 0.17 0.03 0.08 -0.18 * 0.08
Asian -0.17 0.27 -0.28 * 0.12 -0.14 0.12
American Indian/Native Alaskan 0.64 0.44 0.28 0.26 0.41 0.25
Constant -2.65 *** 0.53 -0.45 0.25 -0.65 * 0.25
-2 Log Likelihood
Pseudo R2
N=15,135 Married and Cohabiting Households
*p<05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Source: 2001 Panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation.





Table 4 (cont.): Estimated Coefficients from Multinomial Logistic Regressions Predicting Expense Sharing
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